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THE BONNEVILLE POWER ADMINISTRATION’S 
ENERGY CURTAILMENT PROBLEM: AN ANALYSIS OF 
ITS REDISPATCH POLICY AND OVERSUPPLY 
PROTOCOL P AND THEIR IMPACT ON 
WASHINGTON’S WIND POWER PRODUCERS, UTILITY 
COMPANIES, AND ENERGY INDEPENDENCE ACT 
Drew Pearsall 
Abstract: The Bonneville Power Administration (BPA) is the primary 
transmitter of power in the Pacific Northwest. Charged with operating the 
federal dams on the Columbia River, the BPA also maintains and operates 
15,000 miles of high-voltage power lines that transmit power produced by 
federal and non-federal power sources alike. Under federal law, the BPA must 
accept onto its transmission system power from non-federal sources in a manner 
that is fair, non-preferential, and does not discriminate against non-federal 
sources. Recently, strong snowpack and periods of heavy runoff have stressed 
the Federal Columbia River Power System and has led to a problem: the over-
generation of hydropower for which there is not enough capacity on the 
transmission system. Compounding this problem is the fact that wind power 
generation has greatly increased in the Pacific Northwest over the past decade, 
with no sign of significantly slowing down. The over-generation of power, in 
conjunction with the BPA’s statutory mandate to accept non-federal power 
sources, has created a challenge for the BPA: to maintain the reliability of its 
stressed power transmission system while fulfilling its obligation to accept, in a 
fair and non-discriminatory manner, power from both federal and non-federal 
sources.  
In an attempt to accomplish this task, the BPA began implementing a 
curtailment policy beginning in 2011 that, according to the Federal Energy 
Regulatory Commission, unlawfully discriminated against non-federal wind 
power producers. The BPA has since revised and updated its displacement 
policy; nevertheless, the BPA’s policies continue to unfairly discriminate against 
wind power producers by placing a preference on the generation and 
transmission of federal hydropower at the expense of non-federal wind power. 
Not only do these policies violate the BPA’s statutory obligations and 
requirements of the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission, but they also hurt 
the ability for utility companies in Washington to meet obligations to diversify 
energy portfolios as required by the Washington Energy Independence Act. 
Because wind power is the dominant renewable energy resource available to 
satisfy Washington’s new renewable portfolio standards (RPS), its curtailment is 
problematic for utility companies and consumers alike. This Comment evaluates 
the BPA’s past and existing curtailment polices, their impact on the ability to 
satisfy the goals of the Washington Energy Independence Act, and the ability for 
utility companies in Washington to meet RPS requirements.  
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I. INTRODUCTION 
The Pacific Northwest has long had access to cheap power, 
primarily because of the abundant hydropower generated from 
the many dams built on the Columbia River and its 
tributaries. However, in November 2006, Washington State 
voters approved Initiative 937, requiring utility companies to 
2
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obtain eligible renewable energy resources in order to meet 
specific percentages of their electrical load capacity.1 Codified 
as the Energy Independence Act, the definitions and language 
of the statute effectively preclude hydropower generated by 
dams on the Columbia River and some of its tributaries from 
qualifying as an eligible renewable energy resource.2 This was 
purposeful, as hydropower accounts for over seventy percent of 
the electricity generated in Washington, and the State wanted 
to diversify its renewable energy resources.3 In order for 
electric utilities to meet the requirements of the Energy 
Independence Act to include renewable energy resources 
within their portfolios, they must look to qualifying resources 
as defined in the Energy Independence Act.4 At present, the 
most prominent of these alternative renewable resources is 
wind energy.5 
The Bonneville Power Administration (BPA), the major 
source of power generation and transmission in the Pacific 
Northwest, impacts the ability for Washington utilities to meet 
their renewable energy quotas. By operating more than 15,000 
miles of transmission lines in the Pacific Northwest—
equivalent to seventy-five percent of the transmission service 
in the region—the BPA effectively controls the distribution of 
power in Washington.6 However, as a major generator of 
hydropower the BPA uses most of the transmission system’s 
capacity to distribute its own power, leaving little room for 
additional alternative energy resources to connect to its 
system.7 Thus, without major upgrades to the BPA’s 
1. See Sam Reed, Washington Secretary of State, Initiative 937 (2006) available at
http://www.sos.wa.gov/elections/initiatives/text/i937.pdf. 
2. See WASH. REV. CODE § 19.285.030 (2012); BONNEVILLE POWER ADMIN., ISSUE 
BRIEF: INITIATIVE I-937 WASHINGTON STATE CLEAN AND RENEWABLE ENERGY 2, (2006) 
[hereinafter ISSUE BRIEF]; TODD MYERS, Washington Policy Center: A Guide to 
Initiative 937 Washington Green Energy Quotas 4–5 (2006). 
3. MYERS, supra note 2, at 4–5. See also WASH. REV. CODE § 19.285.020 (2012).
4. WASH. REV. CODE § 19.285.030(10), (18) (2012).
5. See id. § 19.285.030 (2012); MYERS, supra note 2, at 5.
6. See BONNEVILLE POWER ADMIN., DOE/BP–3949, SERVING THE PEOPLE OF THE
NORTHWEST 3–5 (2d ed. 2009) [hereinafter SERVING THE PEOPLE]; BONNEVILLE POWER 
ADMIN., DOE/BP–4280, 2010 BPA FACTS 1–2 (2011), on file with Journal. 
7. See Complaint and Petition for Order Under Fed. Power Act Section 211A Against
Bonneville Power Admin. Requesting Fast Track Processing at 12–14, Iberdrola 
3
Pearsall: The Bonneville Power Administration's Energy Curtailment Problem:
Published by UW Law Digital Commons, 2013
82 WASHINGTON J. OF ENVIRONMENTAL LAW & POLICY [Vol. 3:1 
transmission system the ability of existing and future 
alternative energy resources to reliably integrate their power 
into the system is limited.8 
In 2011, the BPA implemented its Environmental 
Redispatch and Negative Pricing Policies (Redispatch Policy), a 
curtailment policy that limited the transmission of wind power 
across the BPA’s transmission system.9 The BPA implemented 
this policy for many reasons, including: (1) to ease the strain 
placed on the transmission system caused by excess 
hydropower generation during periods when Columbia River 
flows are exceptionally high; (2) to allow the BPA to place this 
excess hydropower generation onto its transmission system; (3) 
to ensure the BPA’s compliance with the Endangered Species 
Act by avoiding harm to fish species; and (4) to maintain 
reliable power transmission across its system.10 FERC 
determined in December 2011 that the curtailment of wind 
power under the BPA’s Redispatch Policy was unduly 
discriminatory and demanded that the BPA stop.11 
In response, the BPA issued a new curtailment policy 
entitled “Oversupply Management Protocol Attachment P” 
(Oversupply Protocol P).12 Oversupply Protocol P fails to 
satisfy the concerns expressed by FERC as it continues to 
curtail the production and transmission of wind power in an 
unfair and discriminatory manner. In turn, this practice 
threatens the ability for some utilities to meet the renewable 
portfolio standards defined in the Energy Independence Act.13 
Renewables, Inc. v. Bonneville Power Admin., No. EL11-44-000 (Fed. Energy 
Regulatory Comm’n, June 13, 2011) [hereinafter Complaint]; BONNEVILLE POWER 
ADMIN., DOE/BP–4288, BPA’S INTERIM ENVIRONMENTAL REDISPATCH AND NEGATIVE 
PRICING POLICIES: ADMINISTRATOR’S FINAL RECORD OF DECISION 7–9, 11 (2011) 
[hereinafter REDISPATCH POLICY]. 
8. See BONNEVILLE POWER ADMIN., DOE/EIS–0422, CENTRAL FERRY-LOWER 
MONUMENTAL 500-KILOVOLT TRANSMISSION LINE PROJECT: DRAFT ENVIRONMENTAL 
IMPACT STATEMENT S1–S2 (2010) (discussing lack of transmission capacity for new 
wind projects developed in southeast Washington). 
9. See generally REDISPATCH POLICY, supra note 7.
10. Id. at 1, 7.
11. Order Granting Petition, 137 FERC ¶ 61,185 (2011).
12. BONNEVILLE POWER ADMIN., OPEN ACCESS TRANSMISSION TARIFF: OVERSUPPLY 
MANAGEMENT PROTOCOL ATTACHMENT P (2012) [hereinafter OVERSUPPLY PROTOCOL 
P]. 
13. See generally Complaint, supra note 7.
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Thus, the BPA’s current energy curtailment policy, as defined 
in its Oversupply Protocol P, continues to have adverse 
ramifications for wind power producers, Washington utility 
companies, and the achievement of the goals articulated in the 
Energy Independence Act. 
This Comment will evaluate the legal and policy 
implications that the BPA’s wind curtailment policies have on 
(1) wind power generation in Washington, (2) the ability of 
Washington utilities to obtain sufficient eligible renewable 
resources necessary to meet the renewable portfolio standards 
codified in the Energy Independence Act, and (3) the prospects 
of reaching certain goals identified in the Energy 
Independence Act, which are affected by these policies. After 
evaluating these issues, this Comment will provide a series of 
recommendations to replace the BPA’s current curtailment 
policy aimed at: addressing the BPA’s power oversupply 
problem, minimizing adverse impacts to wind power producers 
and utility companies caused by curtailment, and creating a 
policy moving forward that is aligned with the goals 
articulated in the Energy Independence Act. 
II. HISTORY AND BACKGROUND
To understand the impacts that the BPA’s current 
curtailment policy has on wind power producers, utility 
companies, and the achievement of goals articulated in the 
Energy Independence Act, it is necessary to consider 
background information regarding the BPA, its prior 
Redispatch Policy, and Washington’s Energy Independence 
Act. 
A. The Bonneville Power Administration 
In the early twentieth century, a series of dams were built 
on the Columbia River and its tributaries to prevent flooding, 
increase the river’s navigability, expand irrigation capacity to 
rural areas, and to harness the river’s power to provide cheap 
electricity to the people and industries of the Pacific 
Northwest.14 Various federal agencies built these dams, 
14. See BONNEVILLE POWER ADMIN., FEDERAL COLUMBIA RIVER POWER SYSTEM 2–3
(2003) [hereinafter FEDERAL COLUMBIA RIVER POWER SYSTEM]. 
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including the Bureau of Reclamation and the Army Corps of 
Engineers,15 but the BPA was tasked with coordinating 
operations amongst the dams and balancing the electrical 
output generated by the waters of the Columbia River.16 
Originally created in 1937 to market the electricity generated 
from the first two large dams built on the river (Grand Coulee 
and Bonneville), the BPA eventually took control of marketing 
the power generated from all the dams on the Columbia River 
with the signing of the Pacific Northwest Coordination 
Agreement and enactment of the Federal Columbia River 
Transmission System Act.17 
The area in which the BPA markets power is commonly 
referred to as the Federal Columbia River Power System 
(FCRPS).18 Within the FCRPS, the BPA controls facilities that 
generate power including: thirty-one federal dams, one non-
federal nuclear power plant at Hanford, and several wind 
projects.19 In addition, the BPA maintains more than 15,000 
miles of power transmission lines throughout its service 
territory, which includes Idaho, Oregon, Washington, western 
Montana and parts of eastern Montana, California, Nevada, 
Utah, and Wyoming.20 The transmission grid operated by the 
BPA “links virtually all utilities in the Northwest,” including 
15. Id. at 2.
16. See Bonneville Project Act of 1937 § 1, 16 U.S.C. § 832 (2006); Federal Columbia
River Transmission System Act of 1974 § 2(a), 16 U.S.C. § 838(a), (d), (f) (2006) 
(making the BPA sole marketing authority of federal generated power on the Federal 
Columbia River Power System and making it a self-funding agency). The BPA was 
created by the Bonneville Project Act of 1937 and housed in the Department of the 
Interior. However, control over the BPA was transferred to the Department of Energy 
when it was created in 1977, which is where it still resides, albeit as a self-funding 
entity that pays for its operations through the sale and transmission of electricity. See 
BONNEVILLE POWER ADMIN., DOE/BP–3818, 70 PROUD MOMENTS IN BPA’S 70 YEARS 1–
8 (2007) [hereinafter 70 PROUD MOMENTS IN BPA’S 70 YEARS]. 
17. 16 U.S.C. § 838(f) (2006); see also 70 PROUD MOMENTS IN BPA’S 70 YEARS, supra
note 16, at 2. 
18. REDISPATCH POLICY, supra note 7, at 2.
19. BONNEVILLE POWER ADMIN., DOE/BP–4224: 2010 ANNUAL REPORT 1 (2010)
[hereinafter 2010 ANNUAL REPORT]. Currently, there are thirty-two completed wind 
projects integrated to BPA’s transmission system, nine ongoing projects that have yet 
to be completed, and twenty-five proposed projects that, if built, will be integrated into 
the transmission system. See BONNEVILLE POWER ADMIN., BPA WIND MAP 2012, 
TRANSMISSION SERVICES, WIND PROJECTS (2012), available at 
http://transmission.bpa.gov/PlanProj/Wind/documents/BPA_wind_map_2012.pdf.  
20. See SERVING THE PEOPLE, supra note 6, at 3–5.
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those that generate their own power, but still rely on the 
“BPA’s [transmission] system rather than building their own 
transmission lines.”21 Together, the BPA’s generation and 
transmission services create its Balancing Authority Area in 
which the BPA must ensure that there is a balance between 
electricity generated and transmission capacity for this 
power.22 
Maintaining transmission system reliability is just one of 
many obligations that the BPA must juggle in its attempt to 
satisfy all of its statutory and court-ordered duties. Important 
to this Comment, however, are the statutory obligations that 
define how the BPA generates and transmits power within its 
Balancing Authority Area. These obligations can be 
categorized as environmental responsibilities and statutory 
responsibilities.23 The first category—environmental 
responsibilities—requires the BPA to comply with the 
Endangered Species Act, as endangered fish species exist in 
the Columbia River. These species are affected by the BPA’s 
decision to either run water through its power generating 
turbines or spill it over the top of the dams.24 
The second category—statutory responsibilities—requires 
the BPA to comply with legal mandates set forth in its 
authorizing statues, such as the Pacific Northwest Electric 
Power Planning and Conservation Act, the Pacific Northwest 
Power Preference Act, the Bonneville Project Act, the Federal 
Columbia River Transmission System Act, the Federal Power 
Act, and legal orders given by FERC.25 Collectively, these 
mandates require the BPA to consider energy conservation and 
the equitable treatment of fish and wildlife top priorities;26 
give Northwest utilities and customers preference in the 
acquisition of power;27 control how the BPA generates, 
transmits, and exchanges power, including excess federal 
21. Id. at 4.
22. REDISPATCH POLICY, supra note 7, at 7.
23. Id. at 1.
24. See FEDERAL COLUMBIA RIVER POWER SYSTEM, supra note 14, at 5–7;
REDISPATCH POLICY, supra note 7, at 5–7. 
25. See REDISPATCH POLICY, supra note 7, at 1.
26. FEDERAL COLUMBIA RIVER POWER SYSTEM, supra note 14, at 4.
27. SERVING THE PEOPLE, supra note 6, at 3.
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power;28 describe the conditions that must be satisfied to allow 
interconnection of non-federal sources to its transmission 
grid;29 and ensure that the BPA provides open, fair and 
nondiscriminatory access to non-federal power generators 
connecting to its transmission system.30 
The BPA’s environmental and statutory responsibilities 
provide the framework within which the BPA must operate its 
power generation and transmission services. Although 
protecting endangered fish species is a top priority, the BPA 
cannot neglect or ignore its other responsibilities.31 The BPA 
recognizes this dilemma, but does not give a clear indication of 
any existing hierarchy that prioritizes its obligations or 
coordinates the multiple objectives created by this array of 
laws.32 Instead, it appears that the BPA utilizes the bevy of 
controlling laws to its advantage by arguing that certain 
responsibilities require action and trump other obligations 
when such arguments benefit the BPA’s operation of the 
FCRPS.33 
B. The BPA’s Curtailment Policies 
 As a federal agency housed in the Department of Energy, 
the BPA has multiple statutory obligations it must follow in 
operating the FCRPS. Although all of its obligations are 
important, the three statutory requirements that most concern 
the BPA in regard to marketing hydropower throughout the 
FCRPS are: (1) to maintain an adequate, efficient, economical, 
and reliable energy supply; (2) to operate a transmission 
system that provides open access to non-federal energy sources 
that is sufficient to integrate and transmit power from federal 
and non-federal power generators; and (3) to mitigate the 
28. See generally Bonneville Project Act of 1937, 16 U.S.C §§ 832a–832m (2006);
Pacific Northwest Consumer Power Preference Act, 16 U.S.C. §§ 837a–837g (2006). 
29. Federal Power Act, 16 U.S.C. §§ 824i–824k (1920), amended by 16 U.S.C. § 839d-
1 (2006) and 25 U.S.C. § 3505 (2006). 
30. Fed. Energy Regulatory Comm’n, Dep’t of Energy, Rules and Regulations, Order
No. 888, Promoting Wholesale Competition Through Open Access Non-Discriminatory 
Transmission Services by Public Utilities; Recovery of Stranded Costs by Public 
Utilities and Transmitting Utilities (1996). 
31. See Complaint, supra note 7, at 16–18.
32. See REDISPATCH POLICY, supra note 7, at 1–7.
33. See, e.g., id. at 5–6, 26–27; 2010 ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 19, at 21, 45.
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impact that dam operations have on fish and wildlife by 
complying with the Endangered Species Act.34 In order to 
fulfill these statutory obligations, the BPA maintains that it 
has discretion in operating its power generation and 
transmission systems.35 
For years, the BPA has been forced to deal with periods of 
over-generation of hydropower.36 When this occurs—often 
because of heavy rains, runoff from large snow pack, or flood 
events caused by the fast dissipation of snowpack—the BPA 
runs excess water through dam turbines which increases the 
amount of hydropower entering the power transmission grid.37 
This affects the BPA’s ability to reliably transmit power as the 
additional hydropower stresses the system, causing overloads 
and potential outages.38 As high water flows have occurred 
with greater frequency in recent years, stresses to the 
transmission system have become even more problematic.39 
Compounding this problem is the Endangered Species Act 
protections of fish found in the Columbia River. This, according 
to the BPA, requires water to be run through dam turbines as 
opposed to spilling it over the dams, so as to avoid an increase 
in Total Dissolved Gas (TDG) levels.40 TDG levels, which are 
regulated by the state, can be dangerous or fatal to fish if too 
high.41 Thus, running the excess water through turbines 
avoids increasing TDG to dangerous levels, but also generates 
34. Redispatch Policy, supra note 7, at 1, 5–7; BONNEVILLE POWER ADMIN., DOE/BP–
4280, 2010 BPA FACTS 1–2 (2011), on file with Journal. 
35. See Complaint, supra note 7, at 4.
36. REDISPATCH POLICY, supra note 7, at 7, 10.
37. See BONNEVILLE POWER ADMIN., BONNEVILLE POWER ADMINISTRATION’S DRAFT 
OVERSUPPLY MANAGEMENT PROTOCOL: A NARRATIVE EXPLANATION 1 (2012) 
[hereinafter BPA’S NARRATIVE EXPLANATION]; REDISPATCH POLICY, supra note 7, at 5–
7. 
38. REDISPATCH POLICY, supra note 7, at 9–10.
39. Id. at 10.
40. Id. at 5–7.
41. Id. Some groups contest this claim, believing that current TDG levels the BPA
uses to determine when to run excess water through its turbines are too low and 
instead, increased spillage would actually benefit endangered fish species. See Protest 
of and Comments on Respondent’s Compliance Filing by Save Our Wild Salmon, 
Pacific Coast Federation of Fishermen’s Associations, Institute for Fisheries 
Resources, Idaho Rivers United, and American Rivers at 4–6, Iberdrola Renewables, 
Inc. v. Bonneville Power Admin., No. EL11-44-002 (Fed. Energy Regulatory Comm’n, 
Mar. 27, 2012) [hereinafter Salmon Protest]. 
9
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additional hydropower.42 
In the past, this excess hydropower generated during high 
water flows was less problematic because there was sufficient 
capacity on the BPA’s transmission system to accommodate 
the increased generation.43 However, in recent years, a boom 
in wind power generation and its subsequent integration onto 
the BPA’s transmission system has stressed the transmission 
grid.44 Thus, there is not sufficient capacity on the 
transmission system for the excess hydropower generated 
during high water events, which can last anywhere from a few 
days to more than a month,45 and existing wind power 
connected to the BPA’s system.46 In order to accommodate the 
increased hydropower entering the transmission grid, the BPA 
reduces the amount of wind power it transmits on its system.47 
Otherwise, the BPA claims that it would not be able to satisfy 
its statutory mandates to maintain transmission reliability, 
keep costs to its consumers low by not paying for wasted power 
generation, and comply with regulations protecting 
endangered fish species.48 
To satisfy these obligations, the BPA implemented its 
Environmental Redispatch and Negative Pricing Policy 
(Redispatch Policy) in 2011, which mandated that other 
sources of energy connected to the BPA’s transmission system 
be shut down when excess hydropower was generated.49 The 
Redispatch Policy was designed to: 
Ensure BPA is taking all reasonable efforts to meet its 
legal responsibilities under the Clean Water Act 
(“CWA”), Endangered Species Act (“ESA”), and court 
order[s] (collectively, “environmental responsibilities), 
as well as BPA’s legal obligations under its authorizing 
42. See REDISPATCH POLICY, supra note 7, at 5–7.
43. Id. at 7, 9–10
44. Id.
45. Id. at 10, 16. In its Redispatch Policy, the BPA admits that high flow events
large enough to trigger redispatch are not rare on the Columbia River. In fact, there is 
a one in three chance of their occurrence, which may last for one month or more. Id. at 
10. 
46. Id. at 9–10.
47. Id. at 14–15.
48. Id.
49. Id. at 15, 19.
10
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legislation, such as the Pacific Northwest Electric 
Power Planning and Conservation Act (“Northwest 
Power Act”), the Federal Columbia River Transmission 
System Act (“Transmission System Act”), the Pacific 
Northwest Power Preference Act (“Preference Act”), and 
the Bonneville Project Act (collectively, “statutory 
responsibilities”), under specific hydro and load 
conditions, and after all reasonably practicable 
mitigating measures have been implemented. In 
addition, Environmental Redispatch will help provide 
options for BPA to maintain system reliability by 
balancing loads and resources within BPA’s Balancing 
Authority Area while meeting BPA’s environmental and 
statutory responsibilities.50 
In practice, the BPA’s Redispatch Policy forced wind power 
producers placing power onto the BPA’s transmission system 
to stop generating and transmitting power so that the BPA 
could utilize that transmission capacity for the distribution of 
its own excess hydropower.51 
This curtailment policy was problematic from the outset and 
was immediately challenged by wind power groups throughout 
the Pacific Northwest.52 In June 2011, a lawsuit was filed with 
FERC alleging that the BPA’s Redispatch Policy provided 
unfair access to its transmission system and thus was unduly 
discriminatory in violation of the Federal Power Act and FERC 
Orders Nos. 888 and 890.53 FERC ultimately determined that 
the Redispatch Policy “significantly diminishes open access to 
transmission, and results in Bonneville providing transmission 
service to others on terms and conditions that are not 
comparable to those it provides itself.”54 FERC required the 
BPA to file a policy “providing for transmission service on 
terms and conditions that are comparable to those under 
50. Id. at 1.
51. See Order Granting Petition, supra note 11, ¶¶ 4–6. See also Ted Sickinger, BPA 
Braces for Strong Spring Runoff, Excess Power and Wind Power Cuts, OREGONLIVE 
(Apr. 7, 2012, 10:32 AM), http://blog.oregonlive.com/environment_impact/print.html 
?entry=/2012/04/wind_farms_bpa_brace_for_power.html (discussing impact to wind 
power producers during actual curtailment event). 
52. See generally Complaint, supra note 7.
53. See id. at 2–7.
54. Order Granting Petition, supra note 11, ¶ 33.
11
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which Bonneville provides to itself and that are not unduly 
discriminatory or preferential.”55 
In an attempt to comply with the terms and conditions set 
forth in FERC’s order, the BPA created Oversupply Protocol P 
and submitted it to FERC.56 However, Oversupply Protocol P 
is not a satisfactory response to the problems FERC identified 
with the BPA’s energy curtailment program. Instead, the 
BPA’s Oversupply Protocol P is a continuation of the defunct 
Redispatch Policy that continues to: (1) unfairly and 
unnecessarily discriminate against the wind power industry, 
(2) inhibit utility companies from obtaining the eligible 
renewable resources necessary to meet Washington’s 
renewable portfolio standards (RPS) targets, and (3) negatively 
impact the State’s ability to achieve the goals set forth in the 
Energy Independence Act. 
C. Washington’s Energy Independence Act 
Washington’s Energy Independence Act was enacted in 2007 
and codified the renewable portfolio standards passed by 
voters, who approved Initiative 937 on November 7, 2006.57 By 
its very nature, the Energy Independence Act is considered a 
renewable portfolio standard (RPS) since it requires electricity 
retailers to “acquire a minimum percentage of their power 
from renewable energy resources.”58 The Energy Independence 
Act is one of the nation’s most stringent and requires 
qualifying utilities—those serving 25,000 or more customers—
to have “eligible renewable resources” make up three percent 
of their overall electric load by January 1, 2012, nine percent of 
their electric load by January 1, 2016, and fifteen percent of 
their electric load by January 1, 2020.59 As of 2009, there were 
55. Id. ¶ 30.
 56 See Compliance Filing of the Bonneville Power Admin. at 3–4, Iberdrola 
Renewables, Inc. v. Bonneville Power Admin., No. EL11-44-000, (Fed. Energy 
Regulatory Comm’n Mar. 6, 2012) [hereinafter Compliance Filing]. 
57. See WASH. REV. CODE § 19.285 (2012); Sam Reed, Wasington Secretary of State,
Initiative 937 (2006), available at http://www.sos.wa.gov/elections/initiatives/text/ 
i937.pdf. 
58. WILLIAM BRIDGES, RENEWABLE PORTFOLIO STANDARDS AND RENEWABLE ENERGY 
CREDITS 1 (2010). 
59. WASH. REV. CODE § 19.285.040(2)(a) (2012).
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seventeen qualifying utility companies in Washington, which 
accounted for more than eighty percent of the State’s electric 
load.60 Some of these utilities will be affected by the BPA’s 
Oversupply Protocol P differently than others, as some utilities 
own their own eligible renewable resource facilities, obtain 
eligible renewable resources from a transmission system not 
controlled by the BPA, or have the financial capability to 
purchase renewable energy credits to meet RPS targets.61 
However, because the BPA controls eighty percent of the 
transmission system, many qualifying utilities will rely on the 
BPA in some capacity for obtaining eligible renewable 
resources.62 
RPS requirements defined in the Energy Independence Act 
do not control or mandate action by the BPA, since the agency 
runs a thoroughly federal, interstate structure in the FCRPS.63 
These State requirements are inherently intertwined with, and 
frustrated by, the BPA’s operation of the FCRPS and its 
control over the transmission system that accepts and delivers 
60. UNITED STATES ENERGY INFO. ADMIN., DOE/EIA–0348(01)/2, WASHINGTON 
ELECTRICITY PROFILE, DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY: TABLE 10—CLASS OF OWNERSHIP, 
NUMBER OF CONSUMERS, SALES, REVENUES, AND AVERAGE RETAIL PRICE BY STATE AND 
UTILITY (Apr. 2011), http://www.eia.gov/cneaf/electricity/st_profiles/washington.html 
[hereinafter QUALIFYING WASHINGTON UTILITIES]; see also DATABASE OF STATE 
INCENTIVES FOR RENEWABLES & EFFICIENCY, WASHINGTON: INCENTIVES/POLICIES FOR 
RENEWABLES & EFFICIENCY (Mar. 15, 2012), http://www.dsireusa.org/incentives/ 
incentive.cfm?Incentive_Code=WA15R [hereinafter STATE INCENTIVES] (stating that 
the seventeen qualifying utilities in Washington account for eighty-four percent of the 
State’s electric load). 
61. See, e.g., AVISTA, INVESTOR-OWNED AND PUBLIC UTILITIES (2011); Order
Regarding 2012 Renewable Energy Target, In the Matter of Avista Corporation’s 
Renewable Energy Target Progress Report Under RCW 19.285.070 and WAC 480-109-
040, Docket UE-120791, at 9 (Wash. Util. and Transp. Comm’n, Sept. 13, 2012). 
62. See, e.g., AVISTA, 2011 ELECTRIC INTEGRATED RESOURCE PLAN 5-1 to 5-5 (2011)
(discussing the need to still rely on the BPA for certain transmission capacity even 
though Avista owns its own generating facilities and transmission system); CLARK 
COUNTY PUBLIC UTILITIES, FINAL INTEGRATED RESOURCE PLAN 9, 46–49, 63–65, 74–75 
(2010) (discussing Clark County’s reliance on the BPA for meeting most of its energy 
needs, including obtaining eligible renewable resources necessary to meet future RPS 
targets). Integrated Resource Plans are invaluable to understanding the energy needs 
of the seventeen qualifying utilities. Each qualifying utility has an Integrated 
Resource Plan. These documents identify how the utility obtains its energy, what its 
energy demands are, projections for meeting RPS targets, and describe challenges to 
obtaining these resources, especially as targets increase to nine percent of total load in 
2016 and fifteen percent of total load in 2020. 
63. REDISPATCH POLICY, supra note 7, at 48.
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seventy-five percent of the Pacific Northwest’s power.64 The 
BPA is required to provide open, fair, and nondiscriminatory 
access to its transmission system under federal law, and 
cannot promote its own hydropower generation over non-
federal power generation, including private wind power 
projects throughout Washington.65 Nevertheless, the BPA’s 
curtailment policies do not provide open access to non-federal 
wind power producers.66 This frustrates the ability for 
Washington utilities to obtain the eligible renewable resources 
necessary to satisfy the requirements set forth in the Energy 
Independence Act. Although Washington’s RPS requirements 
do not have any legal effect on the BPA, compliance with 
FERC’s open access transmission tariff would help utility 
companies meet state-mandated RPS targets by providing 
them better access to a greater amount of eligible renewable 
resources on the BPA controlled transmission system. 
The Energy Independence Act outlines various options 
qualifying utilities may follow in order to comply with RPS 
targets. Two backdoor compliance methods articulated in the 
statute involve utilities: (1) investing four percent of their total 
annual retail revenue on the incremental costs of eligible 
renewable resources, the cost of purchasing renewable energy 
credits (RECs), or a combination of both;67 or (2) satisfying 
three specific requirements, which entail maintaining electric 
load levels for a three year period, not commencing or 
renewing purchases of electricity from sources other than 
renewable resources, and investing one percent of total annual 
revenue on eligible renewable resources, RECs, or a 
combination of both.68 The ability of utility companies to 
comply with RPS requirements using these methods is difficult 
to determine, as is ascertaining the potential pitfalls or 
benefits of these procedures. 
64. See id. at 48, 64–65.
65. See Order Granting Petition, supra note 11, ¶¶ 32–33, 62–65.
66. Id. ¶ 62.
67. WASH. REV. CODE § 19.285.050(1)(a) (2012). Under the Energy Independence
Act, a REC refers to a “tradable certificate of proof of at least one megawatt-hour of an 
eligible renewable resource where the generation facility is not powered by 
freshwater. . . . and the certificate is verified by a renewable energy credit tracking 
system . . . .” Id. § 19.285.030(19). 
68. See id. § 19.285.040(2)(d).
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A more conventional way for utility companies to comply 
with RPS requirements is to directly acquire eligible 
renewable resources, their equivalent RECs, or a combination 
of both to meet the annual targets for the years 2012, 2016, 
and 2020.69 Under this provision, a utility may obtain power 
directly from actual eligible renewable resources or may 
purchase eligible RECs, which are certificates sold in regulated 
markets representing power generated from an eligible 
renewable resource not directly transmitted to a consumer.70 
These certificates serve two purposes. First, they allow for 
increased production of renewable energy, which can then be 
traded or sold for profit, and second, they provide an 
alternative method for utility companies to meet RPS 
requirements. 
A final way to comply with the Energy Independence Act’s 
RPS requirements exists for utility companies that cannot 
obtain enough eligible renewable resources due to “events 
beyond the reasonable control of the utility that could not have 
been reasonably anticipated or ameliorated.”71 Events 
contemplated under this noncompliance defense include 
“weather-related damage, mechanical failure, strikes, lockouts, 
and actions of a governmental authority that adversely affect 
the generation, transmission, or distribution of an eligible 
renewable resource under contract to a qualifying utility.”72 At 
first glance, this section appears to exempt utility companies 
affected by the BPA’s curtailment policies from complying with 
Washington’s RPS obligations; however, it can be argued that 
the Redispatch Policy and Oversupply Protocol P place utility 
companies on notice of events that may affect the distribution 
of eligible renewable resources. Thus, the utility companies 
will not meet the requirements of the statutory exemption 
because they can reasonably anticipate these events and 
attempt to ameliorate them. If this argument fails, and instead 
a utility could achieve RPS compliance without actually 
obtaining eligible renewable resources, then the goals of the 
69. Id. § 19.285.040(2)(a).
70. JOSEPH P. TOMAIN & RICHARD D. CUDAHY, ENERGY LAW IN A NUTSHELL 541
(West Nutshell Series ed., 2d ed. 2011). 
71. WASH. REV. CODE § 19.285.040(2)(i) (2012).
72. Id.
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Energy Independence Act cannot be met. In that situation, the 
BPA’s curtailment policies would essentially make the Energy 
Independence Act ineffective and void, contradicting the clear 
intent of the citizens of Washington who voted to implement 
RPS targets by passing Initiative 937 in November 2006. 
As defined in the Energy Independence Act, eligible 
renewable resources mean “electricity from a generation 
facility powered by a renewable resource other than freshwater 
that commences operation after March 31, 1999,” so long as 
the generating facility is located in the Pacific Northwest or 
the power is delivered to Washington on a real time basis.73 In 
addition, an eligible renewable resource can mean 
“incremental electricity produced as a result of efficiency 
improvements completed after March 31, 1999, to hydroelectric 
generation projects owned by a qualifying utility,” or to 
hydroelectric generation in irrigation pipes and canals located 
in the Pacific Northwest, “where the additional generation in 
either case does not result in new water diversions or 
impoundments.”74 
Under the Energy Independence Act, and as recognized by 
the BPA itself, hydropower generated at dams within FCRPS 
does not qualify as an eligible renewable resource; wind power, 
on the other hand, is a qualifying resource.75 The definition 
purposefully excludes hydropower generated at dams operated 
by the BPA, which already accounts for seventy percent of all 
power generated in Washington.76 Otherwise, the abundance 
of hydropower in Washington would hurt the State’s ability to 
achieve goals articulated in the Energy Independence Act by 
stymieing the development and diversification of alternative 
renewable resources in the State, reducing the development of 
green business and clean technologies in the State, and 
reducing economic opportunities for Washington counties and 
farmers.77 
73. WASH. REV. CODE § 19.285.030(11)(a) (2012).
74. Id. § 19.285.030(11)(b).
75. See id. § 19.285.030; ISSUE BRIEF, supra note 2.
76. 2010 ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 19, at 5 (stating that eighty percent of BPA
electricity comes from hydropower); MYERS, supra note 2, at 5 (noting that as of 2004, 
seventy percent of all energy generated in Washington comes from hydro sources). 
77. WASH. REV. CODE § 19.285.020 (2012). The Energy Independence Act identifies
the following as important goals: promote energy independence in Washington; utilize 
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Unlike the BPA-generated hydropower, wind power qualifies 
as an eligible renewable resource as defined by the Energy 
Independence Act.78 In Washington, wind power accounts for 
nearly seventy-one percent of eligible renewable resource 
generation.79 This percentage is likely to increase as wind 
turbines, both inland and on the coast, continue to be built. In 
fact, wind power in Washington currently generates around 
2400 megawatts of electricity—enough energy to power 
625,000 homes for a year—with 343 additional megawatts 
under construction, and future facilities in the project queue 
that will generate an additional 5800 megawatts of 
electricity.80 Furthermore, future projections indicate that a 
total of 18,479 megawatts of wind power could be produced in 
Washington.81 As the largest eligible renewable resource, wind 
power producers are hurt by the BPA’s curtailment policies 
(e.g. Redispatch Policy and Oversupply Protocol P) that restrict 
access to its transmission system. The reduction in wind power 
caused by curtailment, significant or not, impacts the ability of 
utility companies to acquire the eligible renewable resources 
necessary to meet Washington’s RPS targets. 
In addition to RPS targets and specific renewable resource 
mandates, the Energy Independence Act establishes specific 
policy goals tied to the development of renewable resources, 
including obtaining energy independence within Washington 
State by utilizing the region’s diverse local resources, providing 
economic benefits to counties and farms, creating high-quality 
local resources; provide economic benefits to Washington counties and farmers; create 
high quality, local jobs; provide opportunities within the renewable energy fields; and 
position Washington as a national leader in clean energy technologies. 
78. See id. § 19.285.030(20) (defining “renewable resource”); id. § 19.285.030(11)(a)
(defining “eligible renewable resource”). 
79. See UNITED STATES ENERGY INFO. ADMIN., RENEWABLE & ALTERNATIVE FUELS, 
WASHINGTON RENEWABLE ELECTRICITY PROFILE: 2009 SUMMARY RENEWABLE 
ELECTRIC POWER INDUSTRY STATISTICS (WASHINGTON) TABLE 1 (Jul. 2011), 
http://www.eia.gov/renewable/state/Washington/pdf/washington.pdf [hereinafter 
WASHINGTON RENEWABLE ELECTRICITY PROFILE]. It is important to remind the reader 
that hydropower, for all intents and purposes, is not an eligible renewable resource 
under the Energy Independence Act. The “seventy-one percent” number expressed in 
the text represents the percentage of wind power as calculated against all other 
eligible renewable energy resources. 
80. AM. WIND ENERGY ASS’N, WIND ENERGY FACTS: WASHINGTON 1 (2011).
81. Id.
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local jobs, and establishing Washington as a leader in clean 
energy technologies.82 The Energy Independence Act promotes 
these goals in two ways. First, the Act excludes the vast 
majority of hydropower from qualifying as an eligible 
renewable resource.83 Second, it requires Washington utilities 
to obtain the eligible renewable resources necessary to satisfy 
RPS requirements from generating facilities within 
Washington or from out-of-state facilities that deliver power to 
the utility on a real time basis.84 These two requirements help 
achieve the policy goals articulated in the Energy 
Independence Act by diversifying the State’s renewable 
resources, developing alternative renewable resources, and by 
promoting economic growth through the development of green 
industry and technology within the State. An effective way to 
turn these goals into a reality is by continuing to promote, 
develop, and invest in wind power. 
The continued development of wind power will help fulfill 
the Energy Independence Act’s stated goal of creating energy 
independence in Washington using a local, clean, renewable 
energy resource.85 Just as important, developing wind power 
helps satisfy the economic goals articulated in the Energy 
Independence Act, as it is a direct investment in jobs.86 The 
economic benefits of wind power are twofold. First, in addition 
to the jobs required for the development of the transmission 
system necessary to integrate and deliver the wind power to 
consumers,87 it creates jobs at all stages of development—the 
manufacture, construction, maintenance, and operation of the 
turbines and wind facilities.88 Second, it provides economic 
support to farmers who receive payments for leasing the land 
on which the wind facilities are often built and to rural 
counties whose tax revenues increase through the influx of 
82. WASH. REV. CODE § 19.285.020 (2012)
83. Id. § 19.285.030(11)(a)–(b).
84. Id. § 19.285.030(11)(a).
 85 See Sierra Club 2012 Legislative Priorities for Washington, SIERRA CLUB: 
WASHINGTON STATE CHAPTER, http://cascade.sierraclub.org/priorities/legislation (last 
visited Jan. 11, 2013). 
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activity experienced by local businesses.89 In 2010 alone, wind 
power supported up to 2000 jobs in Washington, generating 
over $13,500,000 in tax payments by project owners and over 
$6,500,000 in lease payments to land owners.90 
As indicated, the Energy Independence Act promotes 
renewable resource development, economic development, and 
energy independence within Washington. It accomplishes 
these goals through the implementation of its RPS targets, 
which currently apply to seventeen qualifying utilities in the 
State.91 To comply with this mandate and work towards 
achieving the policy goals of the Energy Independence Act, the 
seventeen qualifying utility companies must have reliable 
access to eligible renewable resources, especially wind power. 
Reliable access is currently thwarted by the BPA’s curtailment 
policies, specifically its Oversupply Protocol P, a mere 
continuation of its Redispatch Policy condemned by FERC.92  
III. THE BPA’S CURTAILMENT POLICY: OVERSUPPLY
PROTOCOL P
On December 7, 2011, FERC issued an order requiring the 
BPA to provide power transmission service on “terms and 
conditions that are comparable to those under which 
Bonneville provides transmission services to itself and that are 
not unduly discriminatory or preferential.”93 In response to 
this order, the BPA created its Oversupply Protocol P in an 
attempt to satisfy FERC’s requirement that the BPA provide 
fair, non-discriminatory access to the transmission system it 
89. AM. WIND ENERGY ASS’N, supra note 80, at 2; see also Anne Mulkern, Renewable
Energy: Wind is the New Cash Crop in Rural Wash. Town, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 18 2010, 
http://www.nytimes.com/gwire/2010/10/18/18greenwire-wind-is-the-new-cash-crop-in-
rural-wash-town-3529.html. Currently, large wind farms exist in rural areas of 
Klickitat, Kittitas, Columbia, Walla Walla, and Garfield Counties. See AM. WIND 
ENERGY ASS’N, supra note 80. (In addition to increased tax revenues received by the 
county, rural county businesses benefit from wind power development as workers who 
construct and maintain the facilities eat at local restaurants, stay at local hotels, and 
use local gas stations.). 
90. AM. WIND ENERGY ASS’N, supra note 80, at 2.
91. See STATE INCENTIVES, supra note 60.
92. Order Granting Petition, supra note 11, ¶¶ 33, 62–65.
93. Id. ¶ 1.
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operates.94 Although a change from the BPA’s previous 
curtailment policy (the Redispatch Policy), Oversupply 
Protocol P and the Cost Allocation submitted in conjunction 
with the Protocol fail to mitigate the fundamental problem 
FERC identified with the BPA’s curtailment practice: the 
BPA’s displacement of wind power, which results in non-
comparable transmission service, is unduly discriminatory and 
preferential.95 Oversupply Protocol P is merely a continuation 
of the Redispatch Policy invalidated by FERC that gives 
preference to the generation and transmission of federal 
hydropower over non-federal wind power.96 Ultimately, 
Oversupply Protocol P and its Cost Allocation fail to satisfy the 
concerns FERC has with the BPA’s curtailment practices.97 
A. Overview of Oversupply Protocol P 
Oversupply Protocol P requires the BPA to pay non-federal 
wind power producers a fee when their ability to transmit 
power is curtailed during high water flow events.98 Under the 
policy, the BPA will take all actions it deems reasonable to 
reduce or avoid the need to displace wind power and will revert 
to a Least-Cost Displacement Cost Curve (Cost-Curve) in the 
event that displacement must occur.99 The Cost-Curve is a list 
containing the cost of displacement for each generating facility 
within the BPA’s Balancing Authority Area and is based on 
information submitted by the generating facilities, which 
establishes the dollar amount per megawatt-hour ($/MWh) 
that a generator will lose when not producing power.100 
Oversupply Protocol P explains how the cost of displacement is 
calculated, how the BPA will compensate generators for their 
94. See BPA’S NARRATIVE EXPLANATION, supra note 37, at 5.
95. See Order Granting Petition, supra note 11.
96. Id.¶ 78 (“[T]he Commission finds that Bonneville’s Environmental Redispatch
Policy results in non-comparable transmission service that is unduly discriminatory 
and preferential. Accordingly, Bonneville may not extend its current environmental 
redispatch policies or implement new environmental redispatch policies that result in 
noncomparable transmission service.”). 
97. Id.
98. See generally OVERSUPPLY PROTOCOL P, supra note 12.
99. Id. ¶¶ 2–4.
100. Id. ¶¶ 4–5. 
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lost power, and how the agency proposes to minimize these 
costs.101 
A generator’s cost of displacement ($/MWh) is limited based 
on when the generator contracted for the sale of its power. For 
generators with contracts executed before March 6, 2012, the 
cost of displacement includes the amount of partial tax credits 
(PTCs) and contracted-for RECs lost due to displacement in 
addition to penalties a generator incurs for its failure to deliver 
RECs.102 If RECs have not yet been contracted for, a generator 
is paid the fair market value of the potential RECs lost 
because of curtailment.103 If a generator executes a contract 
after March 6, 2012, it is eligible to receive lost PTCs and 
RECs, but will not be compensated for penalties incurred for 
failing to deliver power under the terms of its contracts.104 The 
BPA believes that these generators can build penalty costs into 
future contracts with third parties since Oversupply Protocol P 
places generators on notice that the BPA will not pay these 
penalty costs.105 
The BPA will, however, compensate for curtailment by 
paying generators the cost of power displacement ($/MWh) 
multiplied by the difference between the number of scheduled 
megawatts of generation and the actual megawatts generated 
during curtailment.106 Put in mathematical terms, the BPA 
will pay generators based on the following equation: $/MWh x 
(Scheduled MW – Actual MW generated). In conjunction with 
Oversupply Protocol P, the BPA submitted a rate case in order 
to establish a rate of recovery for costs the BPA incurs under 
Oversupply Protocol P, which the BPA refers to as “Cost 
Allocation.”107 The BPA has proposed to allocate fifty percent of 
the costs it incurs to generators subject to curtailment and the 
other fifty percent of costs it incurs to power purchases from 
the Federal Base System.108 Under the Cost Allocation terms, 
101. Id. ¶¶ 3–6. 
102. Id. ¶ 3(a)(i)–(ii)(A). 
103. Id. ¶ 3(a)(ii)(B). 
104. Id. ¶ 3(b). 
105. See Compliance Filing, supra note 56, at 14–15. 
 106. OVERSUPPLY PROTOCOL P, supra note 12, ¶ 4. 
 107. Compliance Filing, supra note 56, at 21. 
108. Id. 
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the BPA’s Oversupply Protocol P provides power generators 
with two options to determine their compensation for 
curtailment: (1) a generator may submit a cost displacement 
($/MWh) figure, in which case the generator be subject to the 
fifty/fifty Cost Allocation proposed by BPA; or (2) a generator 
can decide to have a cost displacement ($/MWh) figure of 
$0/MWh—in which case the generator will receive no 
compensation for displaced power, but will not be subject to 
the fifty/fifty Cost Allocation proposal.109 
Finally, the BPA will displace power in order of least cost 
facility to highest cost facility as listed on the Cost-Curve, until 
the necessary amount of curtailment is met.110 In addition to 
these Cost-Curve payments, the BPA will continue to replace 
displaced wind power with its own federal hydropower in order 
to maintain transmission schedules.111 
B. Oversupply Protocol P Fails to Satisfy the Conditions of 
FERC’s Order 
FERC invalidated the BPA’s prior curtailment policy, the 
Redispatch Policy, and demanded that the BPA submit a new 
policy that provides access to its transmission system on a fair, 
non-discriminatory and non-preferential basis.112 Oversupply 
Protocol P is the BPA’s attempt to comply with this mandate 
by compensating non-federal wind power producers for the 
forced curtailment of their power.113 However, this added 
economic incentive fails to address the fundamental issue that 
FERC has with the BPA’s curtailment practice—that it 
interrupts non-federal generators’ firm transmission service 
without doing the same to firm transmission service held by 
federal generators, making it unfairly discriminatory and 
preferential to the BPA.114 Ultimately, it is the BPA’s 
Oversupply Protocol P failure to mitigate this practice that 
troubles FERC. 
109. See OVERSUPPLY PROTOCOL P, supra note 12, ¶ 3. 
110. Id. ¶ 2. 
111. Id. at Summary ¶. 
112. See Order Granting Petition, supra note 11, ¶¶ 33, 62–65. 
 113. BPA’S NARRATIVE EXPLANATION, supra note 37, at 5. 
114. See Order Granting Petition, supra note 11, ¶ 62. 
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1. Oversupply Protocol P Fails to Fully Compensate
Curtailment Costs
Oversupply Protocol P is tied to the Cost Allocation that the 
BPA submitted to FERC in conjunction with this policy.115 
Under the Cost Allocation proposal, the BPA will split the 
costs it incurs to curtail wind power on a fifty-fifty basis 
between its ratepayers and the generators whose energy is 
forcibly displaced.116 The BPA believes this is an equitable 
solution since it allows the Administration to meet one of its 
statutory obligations—to provide low-cost power to its 
customers—while allocating costs between the two entities 
causing the problem: the BPA, which over-generates power, 
and the wind power industry whose recent growth helps create 
the oversupply problem.117 Whether correct or not, this 
argument fails to adequately address FERC’s concern over the 
BPA’s curtailment practice, as allocating the cost of 
curtailment on a fifty-fifty basis is still unfair and 
discriminatory for the following reasons. 
First, the over-generation and over-supply of power is 
something the BPA has dealt with for years and that existed 
well before the recent boom in wind power production; thus, 
too much hydropower, not wind power generation, is the 
fundamental cause of the problem.118 Because the problem 
stems from an over-abundance of federal hydropower 
generation, the BPA should be forced to cover all curtailment 
costs. Second, although the recent increase in wind power 
generated in the BPA’s Balancing Authority Area adds 
additional stress to the transmission system, the amount of 
wind power generated accounts for a little more than five 
percent of total statewide power generation.119 Furthermore, 
115. See Compliance Filing, supra note 56, at 4–7. 
 116. See BPA’S NARRATIVE EXPLANATION, supra note 37, at 17; see also OVERSUPPLY 
PROTOCOL P, supra note 12, ¶ 3(b) (noting that wind power producers submitting a 
cost of displacement will be subject to Cost Allocation, described in BPA’S NARRATIVE 
EXPLANATION, supra note 37). 
117. See Compliance Filing, supra note 56, at 21–26. 
 118. REDISPATCH POLICY, supra note 7, at 7, 9–10. 
 119. AM. WIND ENERGY ASS’N, ANNUAL REPORT: WIND POWER BRINGING 
INNOVATION, MANUFACTURING BACK TO AMERICAN INDUSTRY (Apr. 12, 2012), 
http://www.awea.org/newsroom/pressreleases/Annual_Report.cfm. 
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during the 2011 curtailment period (May 13, 2011 through 
July 13, 2011), wind power accounted for only 8.5 percent of 
the power generated in the BPA’s Balancing Authority Area, 
whereas federal hydropower accounted for eighty-nine percent 
of the generated power.120 In its response to comments 
regarding Oversupply Protocol P, the BPA stated that Cost 
Allocation should adhere to the principle of cost causation, 
which equitably distributes costs based on each entity’s 
contribution to the problem.121 As indicated above, non-federal 
wind power makes up only a fraction of the amount of power 
generated in the BPA’s Balancing Authority Area. Therefore, 
wind power producers should not incur fifty percent of 
curtailment costs when federal hydropower generation 
accounts for close to ninety percent of the oversupply 
problem.122 Splitting curtailment costs equally discriminates 
against wind power producers by placing a disproportionate 
amount of the total cost on them and contradicts the BPA’s 
own statements regarding equitable cost causation 
principles.123 
In addition to the fact that wind power producers do not 
equally contribute to the BPA’s over-generation problem, 
Oversupply Protocol P discriminates against these same 
entities by failing to pay them sufficiently for curtailing their 
power production. Oversupply Protocol P provides non-federal 
wind power producers two payment options for displacing their 
power.124 First, these entities can choose to receive no 
compensation for displaced power, in which case they do not 
have to participate in the BPA’s Cost Allocation proposal.125 
This payment option is discriminatory as it fails to pay wind 
power producers money for the forced curtailment of their 
power. In effect, this option is a replica of BPA’s Redispatch 
 120. Protest of Northwest Wind Group and American Wind Energy Association, 
Iberdrola Renewables, Inc. v. Bonneville Power Admin., No. EL11-44-002, 15 (Fed. 
Energy Regulatory Comm’n, Mar. 27, 2012) [hereinafter Wind Protest]. 
 121. BONNEVILLE POWER ADMIN., BPA’S RESPONSE TO COMMENT ON 2012 
OVERSUPPLY MANAGEMENT PROTOCOL 19 (rev. ed., Mar. 28, 2012) [hereinafter BPA’S 
RESPONSE TO COMMENTS]. 
122. See supra notes 119 and 120. 
 123. BPA’S RESPONSE TO COMMENTS, supra note 121, at 19. 
124. See OVERSUPPLY PROTOCOL P, supra note 12, ¶ 3. 
125. Id. 
24
Washington Journal of Environmental Law & Policy, Vol. 3, Iss. 1 [2013], Art. 4
https://digitalcommons.law.uw.edu/wjelp/vol3/iss1/4
2013] BPA’S ENERGY CURTAILMENT PROBLEM  103 
Policy, which FERC explicitly invalidated.126 Second, wind 
power producers can choose to receive payment for their 
displaced power by submitting a cost displacement figure 
($/MWh), which is primarily determined by the amount of 
PTCs and RECs a generator loses during curtailment. 
However, if an entity chooses to receive this payment, it must 
abide by the BPA’s Cost Allocation proposal.127 This option also 
discriminates against non-federal wind generators because it 
fails to compensate them for the actual amount of money lost 
due to curtailment. Although the BPA will pay them for lost 
PTCs, RECs, and contractual penalties incurred (in certain 
situations), the BPA offsets this payment by forcing wind 
generators to split the costs the BPA incurs for implementing 
Oversupply Protocol P, including the payments made to wind 
generators for displacing their power.128 
2. The Cost-Curve Mechanism Is Discriminatory
Oversupply Protocol P also unfairly discriminates against 
facilities that have low displacement costs ($/MWh). The BPA 
relies on the Cost-Curve to determine which non-federal wind 
power facilities will be shut down, displacing energy from 
facilities with the lowest costs first.129 This practice 
disproportionately impacts generators with low costs in order 
to minimize the impact on the Administration’s finances.130 In 
particular, the practice discriminates against public utility 
companies, which are not eligible to receive PTCs, and thus 
inevitably have lower displacement costs than generators that 
are eligible for PTCs.131 Based on the Cost-Curve, these 
entities will be shut down more frequently than wind power 
facilities receiving PTCs.132 Finally, the Cost-Curve 
126. Order Granting Petition, supra note 11, ¶ 78. 
 127. OVERSUPPLY PROTOCOL P, supra note 12, ¶¶ 3(b), 3(c)(i). 
128. Id. ¶ 3(b). 
129. Id. ¶¶ 2, 4. 
130. See Wind Protest, supra note 120, at 13. 
 131. Renewable Energy Tax Credits, THE BOTTOM LINE ON RENEWABLE ENERGY TAX 
CREDITS (WORLD RES. INST., Washington, D.C.), Oct. 2010, at 1, available at 
http://pdf.wri.org/bottom_line_renewable_energy_tax_credits_10-2010.pdf. 
 132. See OVERSUPPLY PROTOCOL P, supra note 12, ¶ 4 (because public utilities do 
not receive PTCs, they will have lower costs of displacement and so will be first on the 
Cost Curve). 
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mechanism is facially preferential towards the BPA as it only 
applies to non-federal power generators. Thus, the BPA’s 
hydropower operations are not subject to curtailment.133 As 
ordered by FERC, the BPA is not allowed to “implement new 
redispatch policies that result in non-comparable transmission 
service” between it and non-federal power sources.134 However, 
this is exactly what the Cost-Curve mechanism does, showing 
that the BPA’s Oversupply Protocol P fails to satisfy FERC’s 
order. 
3. Generators with Contracts Executed After March 6, 2012
Are at a Competitive Disadvantage
In addition to discriminating against wind power producers 
with low displacement costs, Oversupply Protocol P further 
discriminates against all non-federal wind power producers 
with transmission contracts executed after March 6, 2012. 
Under Oversupply Protocol P, the BPA will compensate these 
generators only for PTCs and RECs lost during displacement 
and not for penalties that generator might incur for its failure 
to deliver power to a third-party.135 The BPA claims that non-
federal wind power producers should incorporate into their 
contracts with third-party power recipients language that 
absolves the generators from incurring penalties for failing to 
deliver wind power due to forced curtailment.136 This policy 
places generators with contracts executed after March 6, 2012 
at a competitive disadvantage and discriminates against them 
in three ways: (1) their prices will be higher in order to 
incorporate penalties derived from failing to deliver power due 
to curtailment, (2) they might lose business due to the price 
increases necessary to cover potential liabilities for failing to 
deliver, or (3) they might have to simply cover these penalty 
costs, resulting in diminished profits.137 Non-federal 
generators with contracts executed after implementation of 
 133. See id., Introduction ¶ (specifically referring to the definition of “Transmission 
Provider”). 
134. Order Granting Petition, supra note 11, ¶ 78. 
 135. OVERSUPPLY PROTOCOL P, supra note 12, ¶ 3(b)(ii). 
136. See BPA’S RESPONSE TO COMMENTS, supra note 121, at 5. 
137. See OVERSUPPLY PROTOCOL P, supra note 12, ¶ 3(b)(ii); see also Wind Protest, 
supra note 120, at 16–17. 
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Oversupply Protocol P risk losing business and are at a 
financial disadvantage compared to generators with contracts 
that predate March 6, 2012, a problem created by the BPA’s 
curtailment practice. The BPA’s new curtailment policy, 
Oversupply Protocol P, is inherently unfair and so does not 
comply with the requirements detailed in FERC’s order.138 
IV. IMPACT OF THE BPA’S CURTAILMENT POLICIES ON
WIND POWER PRODUCERS, QUALIFYING
UTILITIES, AND THE ENERGY INDEPENDENCE ACT
The BPA claims that its Redispatch Policy did not affect a 
customer’s transmission rights,139 that it left transmission 
service unaffected because the overall quantity of energy 
delivered remained the same,140 that it was merely a limitation 
on the ability to generate power,141 that it went to great 
lengths to ensure wind generation was not affected,142 and that 
substitution of hydropower for wind power did not constitute 
improper curtailment.143 FERC’s order determining that the 
Redispatch Policy was unfair, discriminatory, and preferential 
towards BPA proved these statements incorrect. In response, 
the BPA contends that its Oversupply Protocol P “complies 
with the Commission’s [FERC] direction to provide comparable 
transmission service.”144 The BPA contends the policy is fair 
because it compensates those affected by curtailment in an 
equitable manner and represents a reasonable alignment of 
costs and benefits.145 Ultimately, the BPA believes the 
proposal “satisfies the Commission’s [FERC] injunction to 
provide fair and equitable solutions to the BPA’s oversupply 
problem.”146 Nevertheless, Oversupply Protocol P is a 
continuation of the BPA’s curtailment program, posing very 
 138. Order Granting Petition, supra note 11, ¶ 78; see also REDISPATCH POLICY, 
supra note 7, at 25. 
 139. REDISPATCH POLICY, supra note 7, at 43. 
140. Id. at 25. 
141. Id. 
142. Id. at 26. 
143. Id. at 26, 43. 
 144. BPA’S NARRATIVE EXPLANATION, supra note 37, at 11–12. 
145. Id. at 12, 17. 
146. Id. at 12–13. 
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real, adverse impacts to the wind power industry, the ability 
for Washington utility companies to meet RPS targets, and the 
ability to achieve certain goals identified in the Energy 
Independence Act. 
A. Impact on Wind Power Producers 
BPA’s Oversupply Protocol P negatively impacts the wind 
power industry in two ways. First, the policy hurts the ability 
of wind power producers to transmit power reliably, affecting 
their ability to satisfy contractual obligations made with 
entities off-loading wind power.147 Second, by continuing to 
shut down wind power production and thus decreasing PTC 
and REC payments, the policy’s Cost Allocation lessens wind 
power producers’ economic viability that otherwise helps 
promote the continued development of this green industry.148 
As capital costs for wind projects are high, these subsidies are 
an important tool for spurring future growth and development 
of the wind power industry. 
For instance, between May 18, 2011 and June 13, 2011, the 
BPA invoked its curtailment authority for “several hours 
almost every day, curtailing more than 60,000 megawatt-hours 
of wind generation,” while seizing the newly created 
transmission capacity to deliver its own hydropower to 
customers who had specifically contracted to receive wind 
power.149 Under Oversupply Protocol P, wind power producers 
either receive no compensation for this lost output or receive 
less than the actual value of the power produced as defined by 
the terms of BPA’s fifty-fifty Cost Allocation.150 The 
 147. See Sickinger, supra note 51, at 3–4; see also REDISPATCH POLICY, supra note 7, 
at 70 (noting that curtailment generally affects the ability to satisfy third-party 
contracts). 
148. See Sickinger, supra note 51, at 2. 
 149. Complaint, supra note 7, at 3. Several specific wind power facilities have been 
hurt by the BPA’s Redispatch Policy: Iberdrola Renewables, Inc. (1300 megawatt 
facility and purchases BPA services); PacifiCorp (two facilities and purchases BPA 
services); NextEra Energy Resources, LLC (two facilities with total capacity of 115 
megawatts and purchases BPA services); Invenergy Wind North America LLC 
(interconnection agreements subject to redispatch); and Horizon Wind Energy LLC 
(facilities with 300 megawatts interconnected to the BPA’s transmission service with 
additional projects generating 900 megawatts under construction). See id. at 10–12. 
 150. OVERSUPPLY PROTOCOL P, supra note 12, ¶ 3. According to the BPA’s own 
calculations, PTCs are valued at $21 per megawatt-hour while RECs range from $8 to 
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curtailment of wind power under the BPA’s curtailment 
program significantly impacts the profitability of wind power 
producers. 
Wind power producers within the BPA’s Balancing 
Authority Area suffer adverse impacts from the BPA’s ability 
to curtail their power; however, curtailment also affects utility 
companies, who are unable to reliably obtain the wind power 
they contracted to receive.151 
B. Impact on Qualifying Washington Utilities 
Although wind power producers directly suffer from the 
BPA’s Oversupply Protocol P, curtailing wind power will also 
adversely affect qualifying Washington utilities by reducing 
the amount of eligible renewable resources available to comply 
with RPS requirements and avoid stiff penalties.152 It is 
important to note that not all of the seventeen qualifying 
utility companies receive their eligible renewable resources 
from generators impacted by the BPA’s curtailment program. 
However, the BPA’s Oversupply Protocol P will hurt those that 
do.153 Because wind power transmitted by the BPA is the 
predominant eligible renewable resource in Washington, minor 
or significant reductions to its availability will make it difficult 
for utility companies to meet their RPS requirements.154 
$20 per megawatt-hour. See REDISPATCH POLICY, supra note 7, at 11. Using these 
dollar amounts, one month of curtailment like what occurred between May and June 
of 2011 would cost the wind power industry $1,260,000 in PTCs and anywhere from 
$480,000–$1,200,000 in RECs. According to a peer-reviewed study conducted by the 
BPA, the value of PTCs and RECs lost to curtailment could cost $50,000,000 in 2012 
alone. REDISPATCH POLICY, supra note 7, at 20, 66. 
 151. Complaint, supra note 7, at 4. 
 152. Id.; see also REDISPATCH POLICY, supra note 7, at 48, 64–65, 68. (noting initial 
concerns by some qualifying utilities that curtailing wind power will inhibit their 
ability to meet RPS targets). Failing to meet RPS targets results in a $50 fine per 
megawatt-hour shortage, which can lead to steep penalties. See WASH. REV. CODE § 
19.285.060 (2012). 
 153. See, e.g., AVISTA, supra note 62, at 5-1 to 5-5 (noting the extensive transmission 
system Avista privately owns and controls, its predominant reliance on its own 
generating sites for eligible renewable resources, and its minimal use of BPA’s 
transmission system); CLARK COUNTY PUBLIC UTILITIES, supra note 62 at 9, 37, 46–49, 
63–65, 74–75 (noting its extensive reliance on BPA’s generation and transmission 
systems and expressing concerns about meeting RPS targets and uncertainty over the 
existence of enough wind power to meet future RPS targets). 
154. Id.; see also AM. WIND ENERGY ASS’N, supra note 80, at 1 (noting that wind 
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This will be especially true as RPS targets increase to 
comprise fifteen percent of a utility company’s overall load.155 
If a utility is unable to meet its RPS target, it will be fined fifty 
dollars for every megawatt-hour shortfall that occurs.156 It is 
important to note that the Energy Independence Act provides 
utility companies a type of force majeur defense that excuses 
noncompliance with the RPS requirements in certain 
situations.157 Under this provision, a qualifying utility will be 
in compliance with the annual RPS targets if: 
[E]vents beyond the reasonable control of the utility 
that could not have been reasonably anticipated or 
ameliorated prevented it from meeting the renewable 
energy target. Such events include weather-related 
damage, mechanical failure, strikes, lockouts, and 
actions of a governmental authority that adversely 
affect the generation, transmission, or distribution of an 
eligible renewable resource under contract to a 
qualifying utility.158 
This seemingly provides utilities with a way to avoid fines 
by claiming that the BPA’s curtailment policy falls within the 
meaning of an “event” as defined in the statute. 
Key to this provision, however, is its insistence that the 
events be “beyond the reasonable control of the utility” and 
that they could not be “reasonably anticipated or 
ameliorated.”159 Two arguments against utilities using this 
provision to avoid fines come to mind. First, by publishing its 
Redispatch Policy and Oversupply Protocol P, the BPA has 
arguably notified both wind power producers connecting to its 
transmission system and the utilities that obtain this power of 
the possibility that this eligible renewable resource will be 
power provides 4.6 percent of all Washington’s power); Washington Renewable 
Electricity Profile, supra note 79, at tbl.1. See also Sickinger, supra note 51, at 2; 
REDISPATCH POLICY, supra note 7, at 48, 68; Order Granting Petition, supra note 11, ¶ 
63 (all referencing the difficulties utility companies will have if wind power 
curtailment continues). 
 155. See WASH. REV. CODE § 19.285.040(2)(a)(iii) (2012); SNOHOMISH COUNTY PUB. 
UTILITY DIST., 2010 INTEGRATED RESOURCE PLAN 49 (Aug. 17, 2010). 
 156. WASH. REV. CODE § 19.285.060(1) (2012). 
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curtailed throughout the year. Therefore, utilities would have 
a hard time claiming that they could not anticipate potential 
shortfalls in obtaining eligible resources necessary to meet the 
statutorily-required RPS targets.160 Second, having been put 
on notice that curtailment will occur, utilities could look to 
obtain eligible renewable resources from providers not 
connected to the BPA’s transmission system and thus not 
subject to Administration’s curtailment policies.161 Therefore, 
it would be difficult for utilities to claim that events leading to 
noncompliance were out of their reasonable control.162 It is 
difficult to imagine that the State would allow qualifying 
utilities to utilize this defense to avoid fines and escape 
compliance with RPS targets, which serve as the basis for 
achieving the goals of the Energy Independence Act. 
Turning to the fifty dollar per megawatt-hour penalty 
provision, we can look at an example to put its significance into 
perspective. Snohomish County Public Utility District (PUD) is 
a qualifying utility under the Energy Independence Act.163 In 
2009, Snohomish PUD sold 6,872,796 megawatt-hours of 
electricity.164 In 2012, three percent of this total amount of 
electricity was required to come from eligible renewable 
resources, or, the equivalent of 206,183.08 megawatt-hours. 
Under a worst case scenario (e.g. if Snohomish County PUD 
obtained zero percent of its requirement) Snohomish County 
PUD would be on the hook for $10,309,194. Although this is an 
extreme scenario, this potential liability demonstrates the 
potentially devastating impact a failure to meet RPS 
requirements could have on a utility company.165 
160. Id. 
 161. For example, Avista, an investor-owned utility, generates eighty-five percent of 
its own electricity from projects it owns, operates, and transmits itself. See AVISTA, 
supra note 61, at 1. See also QUALIFYING UTILITIES’ REPORTED COMPLIANCE WITH I-
937’S 3% RENEWABLE ENERGY STANDARD FOR 2012, at 2, n.5 (Sept. 2012) (noting that 
Puget Sound Energy listed five of its own wind projects as eligible renewable resources 
to help meet the RPS target). 
 162. WASH. REV. CODE § 19.285.040(2)(i) (2012). 
 163. See QUALIFYING UTILITIES’ REPORTED COMPLIANCE WITH I-937’S 3% 
RENEWABLE ENERGY STANDARD FOR 2012, supra note 161, at 2 (listing the seventeen 
qualifying utilities and their reported compliance for 2012). 
 164. QUALIFYING WASHINGTON UTILITIES, supra note 60, at tbl.10 cell 9. 
 165. To put the $10,309,194 into perspective, Snohomish County PUD had revenues 
of $512,094,000 in 2009. Therefore, $10,309,194 is equal to two percent of Snohomish 
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A more realistic calculation to show the potential impact 
that failing to meet RPS targets could have on a utility is as 
follows: in 2020, Snohomish County PUD must obtain fifteen 
percent of its electrical load from eligible renewable resources, 
or the equivalent of 129.5 annual megawatts (the amount of 
megawatts required per day for an entire year).166 According to 
Snohomish County PUD, it will fall 64.3 annual megawatts 
short of achieving its 2020 RPS target.167 When converted to 
megawatt-hours, this shortfall equates to 1543.2 annual 
megawatt-hours, or a total of 563,268 megawatt-hours a 
year.168 Under this scenario, Snohomish County PUD must 
acquire an additional 563,268 megawatt-hours of power from 
eligible renewable resources in order to comply with the RPS 
targets for 2020.169 A fifty dollar fine is imposed for every 
megawatt-hour that Snohomish County PUD falls short of 
meeting its RPS target, which equates to a potential maximum 
fine of $28,163,400—a severe penalty for failing to meet RPS 
requirements.170 
C. Impact on Washington’s Energy Independence Act 
Because the BPA sells nearly forty-five percent of all 
electricity consumed in the Pacific Northwest and operates 
more than 15,000 miles of high-voltage transmission lines, 
equivalent to eighty percent of the transmission network in the 
Pacific Northwest, policies that curtail the generation and 
transmission of eligible renewable resources adversely affect 
producers, utility companies, and consumers alike.171 If the 
BPA forces renewable resource producers to stop producing 
energy, those producers lose money.172 If utility companies 
County PUD’s total revenue for 2009. See SNOHOMISH COUNTY PUB. UTILITY DIST., 
supra note 155, at 51. 
166. Id. 
167. Id. 
 168. To convert annual megawatt-hours into the total number of megawatts hours 
in a year, multiply the annual megawatt hours—in this case 1543.2—by the days in a 
calendar year. 
 169. See WASH. REV. CODE § 19.285.040(2)(a)(iii) (2012) (regarding electrical load 
requirement for 2020). 
170. See id. § 19.285.060(1) (regarding penalty amount). 
171. See Complaint, supra note 7, at 12. 
172. See REDISPATCH POLICY, supra note 7, at 28–31, 48–49, 62–67 (noting, amongst 
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cannot obtain enough eligible renewable resources to meet 
RPS targets, they will be fined.173 If utility companies are 
penalized for noncompliance, then consumers will be hurt as 
they will bear the brunt of the generators’ and utilities’ losses 
through increased rates.174 These trickle-down effects created 
by the BPA’s Oversupply Protocol P could compromise 
achieving the goals articulated in the Energy Independence 
Act and lead to significant changes to the statute. 
1. Implication for Achieving the Goals of the Energy
Independence Act
Broadly defined, the three main goals articulated in the 
Energy Independence Act are to promote the development of 
alternative renewable energy resources, increase the capacity 
and use of local renewable energy resources, and develop a 
green economy in Washington.175 Achieving these goals will be 
difficult if curtailment policies such as the BPA’s Oversupply 
Protocol P continue to undermine the foundation for 
accomplishing all three aims—the reliable generation and 
transmission of eligible renewable resources like wind power. 
To begin, the development of eligible renewable resources in 
Washington will not continue if generators are unable to 
transmit the power they produce.176 Because the BPA controls 
eighty percent of the transmission system in the Pacific 
Northwest,177 and because its curtailment policies create 
discriminatory, inconsistent, and unreliable access to the 
transmission grid, renewable power producers have no 
incentive to operate existing facilities or build new ones.178 
other problems, that the curtailing energy will cost wind energy producers nearly 
$50,000,000 in 2012 alone, that curtailing wind power costs these producers potential 
revenue received for PTCs and RECs, and that curtailment does have a negative 
economic impact on wind power producers). 
 173. WASH. REV. CODE § 19.285.060(1) (2012). 
 174. See Erik Smith, Ratepayers Paying Wind Farmers Not to Produce Electricity—
$2.7 Million So Far This Year, WASH. STATE WIRE (Sept. 19, 2012), 
http://washingtonstatewire.com/blog/too-much-windpower-rivers-surged-this-summer-
and-oversupply-cost-2-7-million/. 
175. See WASH. REV. CODE § 19.285.020 (2012). 
176. See REDISPATCH POLICY, supra note 7, at 62; Sickinger, supra note 51, at 2. 
 177. Complaint, supra note 7, at 13. 
178. See REDISPATCH POLICY, supra note 7, at 62; Sickinger, supra note 51, at 2; 
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Therefore, the practical effect of the BPA’s Oversupply Protocol 
P is to create “inefficient market operation and participation, 
[a] loss of confidence in markets and market operations, [and] 
disincentives to develop renewable generation” in 
Washington.179 As many power companies and renewable 
energy coalitions have suggested, the BPA’s curtailment 
policies will “discourage the development of renewable 
resources in the Pacific Northwest.”180 
Inconsistency in the reliable transmission of wind power 
caused by curtailment will also stagnate the growth and use of 
local renewable energy resources. For instance, wind power 
producers, currently the State’s largest producers of eligible 
renewable energy,181 rely on PTCs and RECs to make 
money.182 To obtain these, wind facilities must generate 
power,183 which does not occur during curtailment because 
facilities are forced to shut down.184 By depriving wind power 
producers of their major source of income and by creating 
unreliable service conditions,185 the BPA’s Oversupply Protocol 
P discourages the development of new facilities in Washington 
and encourages the development of new facilities in states not 
impacted by such curtailment policies. This creates two 
problems. First, wind power companies will not expand 
development in Washington, so the use of local renewable 
energy resources to satisfy Washington’s power demands will 
level out. Second, Washington utility companies will be forced 
to turn to out of state producers to obtain eligible renewable 
resources required to meet RPS targets. Combined, these 
effects contradict the goal of the Energy Independence Act of 
securing Washington’s energy independence through the use of 
local resources.186 
Complaint, supra note 7, at 34, 66; Order Granting Petition, supra note 11, ¶ 63. 
 179. Complaint, supra note 7, at 66. 
 180. REDISPATCH POLICY, supra note 7, at 62. 
181. See Washington Renewable Electricity Profile, supra note 79, at tbl.1. 
 182. Complaint, supra note 7, at 3–4. 
183. Id. at 13. 
184. See Sickinger, supra note 51, at 2; OVERSUPPLY PROTOCOL P, supra note 12, 
summary ¶. 
185. See Sickinger, supra note 51, at 2–3. 
 186. WASH. REV. CODE § 19.285.020 (2012). 
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Finally, as wind power facilities move elsewhere and plans 
for future expansion and development within Washington are 
scrapped, “green” jobs will disappear thwarting yet another 
goal articulated in the Energy Independence Act.187 The 
Energy Independence Act states, “[m]aking the most of our 
plentiful local resources will . . . provide economic benefits for 
Washington counties and farmers, [and] create high-quality 
jobs in Washington.”188 The BPA’s Oversupply Protocol P 
inhibits the development of a green economy in Washington 
by: (1) reducing tax revenues that counties would receive from 
the development of new wind facilities, (2) reducing the 
amount of money local farmers would receive from leasing land 
to the wind power producers to place turbines on their 
property, and (3) reducing income that third parties would 
receive for transporting, constructing, and maintaining 
turbines and wind power facilities. 
As addressed in comments made to the BPA by Community 
Renewable Energy Association, Renewable Northwest Project, 
Horizon Wind Energy LLC, Pacific Gas & Electric, and 
Iberdrola Renewables, Inc., BPA’s curtailment policies “will 
lead to a decrease in new renewable energy projects and 
economic development in rural communities.”189 Thus, 
achieving a major goal expressed in the Energy Independence 
Act will not occur and could force substantial changes to the 
Energy Independence Act, which goes against the will of the 
voters who passed Initiative 937 establishing the RPS targets 
and fundamental goals codified in the Energy Independence 
Act. 
2. Policy Implications for the Energy Independence Act
Achievement of the goals expressed in the Energy 
Independence Act will be negatively impacted by the BPA’s 
Oversupply Protocol P and could force the Washington 
187. Id. 
 188. Id. See also AM. WIND ENERGY ASS’N, supra note 80, at 2 (detailing the 
economic benefits of wind power development in Washington); SIERRA CLUB: 
WASHINGTON STATE CHAPTER, supra note 85 (noting that Initiative 937, codified as the 
Energy Independence Act, has generated over $7 billion in renewable energy 
investments in Washington). 
 189. REDISPATCH POLICY, supra note 7, at 62. 
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Legislature to change the requirements set forth in the 
statute. The cause of potential change is simple: utility 
companies that once supported the progressive standards190 
and the people who supported and voted for Initiative 937191 
will not support legislation that costs companies large sums of 
money. Moreover, onetime supporters are unlikely to continue 
to support legislation that creates unachievable RPS targets 
and that hurts family income due to rate hikes to account for 
penalties incurred for noncompliance and allocated costs 
stemming from curtailment.192 As a result, changes to the 
Energy Independence Act might occur that would prohibit 
achieving the goals stated in the original act.193 
If the Energy Independence Act was amended to make RPS 
targets more achievable, there are three potential changes that 
are more likely: (1) changing the definition of “eligible 
renewable resources” to include hydropower, which is mostly 
prohibited; (2) changing the RPS targets by either reducing the 
percentage of eligible renewable resources that must make up 
a utility’s electric load or by extending the dates for 
implementing the requirements; and (3) adding strong 
excusable noncompliance defenses for utility companies. Any of 
these changes would negatively impact the goals articulated in 
the Energy Independence Act and would be regressive actions 
that hurt Washington’s energy independence. 
For instance, changing the definition of “eligible renewable 
resource” to include hydropower would diminish efforts to 
diversify Washington’s energy portfolio through the 
 190. See Washington Energy Conservation, Initiative 937 (2006), BALLOTPEDIA, 
http://ballotpedia.org/wiki/index.php/Washington_Energy_Conservation,_Initiative_93
7_(2006) (last visited June 8, 2013) (noting that many energy groups and 
environmentalists, including the Washington Public Utility Districts Association, 
supported the initiative’s passage). 
 191. See id. (noting that the bill passed with 61 percent of the vote and that many 
local and State public officials endorsed the initiative). 
 192. See, e.g., Cowlitz PUD to Increase Electric Rates, THE REFLECTOR (Nov. 2, 2011, 
9:00AM), http://www.thereflector.com/news/article_df1e39f2-03ef-11e1-b377-
001cc4c03286.html?mode=story. 
 193. See Smith, supra note 174, at 3–4 (noting that bills in both the Washington 
House and Senate were introduced in 2012 to change the terms of I-937, delay its 
implementation, and “dial back” its conditions.). See also H.B. 2682, 62nd Leg. (Wash. 
2012), S.B. 6418, 62nd Leg. (Wash. 2012) (proposed bills aimed at delaying the 
implementation of I-937’s requirements). 
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development of alternative renewable resources like wind 
power.194 This action would make meeting RPS targets an 
easier task because hydropower currently accounts for seventy 
percent of all power generated in Washington. There would be 
no need or incentive to invest in and develop alternative 
renewable resources necessary to diversify the State’s energy 
portfolio.195 This not only hurts the diversity of the State’s 
energy resources, but it also impacts the development of a 
“green” economy in Washington by decreasing incentives to 
build new renewable resource facilities that satisfy the existing 
definition of “eligible renewable resources.”196 Because 
hydropower is easily obtainable and the infrastructure for its 
generation and transmission already exist (and are 
predominantly controlled by the BPA) utility companies could 
satisfy RPS targets with existing power resources.197 There 
would be no need to develop wind power facilities or other 
currently eligible renewable resource options. A failure to do so 
would hurt county tax revenues, decrease farmers’ income 
from leasing land for turbine placement, and cut jobs 
otherwise created for the construction, operation, and 
maintenance of these facilities. 
Adjusting the RPS targets with which utility companies 
must comply would also adversely impact the State’s ability to 
achieve the Energy Independence Act’s stated goals. For 
example, decreasing the RPS targets hurts the development of 
a “green” economy as there would be less need overall for 
additional eligible renewable resources. This eliminates jobs 
that would otherwise be required to construct the new facilities 
and infrastructure necessary to accommodate the increase in 
power generation. Not only does this hurt those directly 
involved at all stages of the construction and operation 
processes, but it also hurts county tax revenues and takes 
money out of farmers’ pockets, as they would not receive lease 
payments from the placement of turbines on their land. 
Extending the dates for RPS target compliance would 
similarly impact developing a “green” economy. First, power 
194. See Smith, supra note 174. 
 195. MYERS, supra note 2, at 4–5. 
 196. WASH. REV. CODE § 19.285.030(11), (20) (2012). 
197. See Smith, supra note 174. 
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producers that have already developed facilities in anticipation 
of generating enough power to meet the needs of utilities and 
under the existing implementation structure would lose their 
investments. Second, procrastinating will leave alternative 
renewable resource producers in limbo when deciding whether 
to move forward with the construction of approved facilities, 
whether to apply for permits to build future facilities, or to 
increase production at existing facilities because it would be 
unknown when additional resource capacity would be required. 
Therefore, increasing the number of unknowns involved with 
these already expensive “green” energy projects will further 
slow the process, negatively impacting State revenues and the 
development of a “green” economy in Washington. 
Finally, an amendment to the Energy Independence Act 
creating excusable noncompliance defenses for utility 
companies that do not meet the RPS targets might be effective, 
so long as it is stringent enough to dissuade illegitimate claims 
by utilities. If written too broadly or too vaguely, such an 
amendment could become a vast loophole that utilities use to 
avoid complying with the RPS targets. The implications that 
the BPA’s curtailment policies have on Washington’s Energy 
Independence Act are significant. Whether directly making the 
goals of the Energy Independence Act unachievable or forcing 
changes to the act in order to make compliance possible, the 
BPA’s current curtailment policy, Oversupply Protocol P, 
threatens to defeat the will of Washington citizens who voted 
to implement aggressive RPS targets in order to diversify the 
State’s renewable resources, develop a “green” economy, and 
provide the State with energy independence.198 
V. CONCLUSION 
The BPA’s curtailment policies are inadequate approaches to 
curbing the over-generation of power during times of high 
water flow on the Columbia River. Both its Redispatch Policy 
and Oversupply Protocol P fail to address the problem in a way 
that satisfies FERC’s demand that the BPA provide fair, 
comparable, and nondiscriminatory access to its transmission 
198. See WASH. REV. CODE § 19.285.020 (2012). 
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system.199 However, other remedies exist that the BPA could 
pursue in order to address its over-generation problem without 
curtailing wind power production in a manner that runs 
counter to FERC’s requirements. 
Of the potential remedies, five are notable: (1) supporting 
dam removal on the Columbia River to free up transmission 
capacity that could then be filled with increased wind power 
generation;200 (2) supporting efforts to increase State 
mandated TDG levels, thereby allowing additional water to be 
spilled over the tops of dams during high flow events;201 (3) 
increasing its water storage capacity through aquifer 
replenishment and pumped storage mechanisms;202 (4) 
upgrading and expanding its transmission system to allow for 
more energy to be placed on the system at any given time and 
to accommodate the continued growth of the wind power 
industry;203 and (5) implementing a fair compensation 
mechanism that compensates wind power producers for the 
actual amount of money lost during curtailment periods. Some 
of these proposals are more feasible than others, yet all are 
legitimate alternatives to the BPA’s current curtailment policy, 
Oversupply Protocol P, that continues to preference BPA 
hydropower and provides wind power producers with unfair, 
199. See Order Granting Petition, supra note 11, ¶ 78. 
200. See Associated Press, Wind Power Briefly Exceeds Northwest Hydro Power, 
SEATTLE TIMES (Oct. 24, 2012, 7:09 AM), 
http://seattletimes.com/html/localnews/2019509822_apornorthwestwindpower.htm 
(showing that enough wind power is generated to fill diminished capacity that would 
result from dam removal); AM. WIND ENERGY ASS’N, supra note 80, at 1 (noting that 
Washington wind power can currently supply sixty-four percent of the State’s energy 
needs); SAVE OUR WILD SALMON, REVENUE STREAM: AN ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF THE 
COSTS AND BENEFITS OF REMOVING THE FOUR DAMS ON THE LOWER SNAKE RIVER 8–9 
(2009), http://www.wildsalmon.org/images/stories/PDFs/revenuestream8.pdf 
(discussing how dam removal will not inhibit the ability to meet power needs). 
 201. Salmon Protest, supra note 41, at 5–6. 
 202. See BPA’S RESPONSE TO COMMENTS, supra note 121, at 14–16 (noting that 
aquifer replenishment could eventually be an option if feasible aquifers are presented 
to the BPA; additionally, pumped storage is viable and would continue to be 
researched by BPA as an option to address its over generation problem). 
 203. See Order Granting Petition, supra note 11, ¶ 35; Press Release, Bonneville 
Power Admin., Wind Power on BPA System Sets Another New Record: The Renewable 
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discriminatory transmission service.204 
Although the above actions are feasible alternatives to the 
BPA’s current curtailment policy, some are more viable than 
others. For instance, dam removal is extremely expensive, time 
consuming, and requires action by Congress, which is unlikely 
given today’s political climate.205 Aquifer replenishment and 
pumped storage would also require political action and 
potential sites must be identified, evaluated, and prepared for 
such a large project with environmental implications of its 
own. However, the other alternatives—supporting efforts to 
increase Washington’s maximum TDG level, investing in 
upgrades to its transmission system, and implementing a fair 
compensation mechanism that fully compensates wind power 
producers affected by continued curtailment—are reasonable 
positions that would help solve the BPA’s over-generation and 
discriminatory transmission system access problems. 
A. Support Efforts to Increase Washington’s Maximum TDG 
Level 
States set TDG levels that limit BPA’s ability to spill water 
over the tops of dams, as required by the Clean Water Act.206 
Currently, Washington’s maximum TDG level is lower than 
Oregon’s by five percent.207 To avoid problems stemming from 
the differing standards, the BPA operates the FCRPS in 
accordance with Washington’s lower level.208 However, 
environmental groups and government agencies contend that 
Washington’s limits are too low and that higher TDG levels 
would benefit endangered fish species and reduce the amount 
of power that the BPA must curtail during high water 
204. See Sickinger, supra note 51, at 3. 
 205. It is interesting to note that wind power could provide the energy necessary to 
account for the lost production from removed dams as wind power output recently 
exceeded the amount of hydropower generated and transmitted on BPA’s transmission 
system for the first time. See Wind Power Briefly Exceeds Northwest Hydro, supra note 
200. Moreover, a recent resource assessment conducted by the National Renewable 
Energy Lab estimates that Washington wind power could provide sixty-four percent of 
the State’s current energy needs. See AM. WIND ENERGY ASS’N, supra note 80, at 1. 
 206. Salmon Protest, supra note 41, at 4. 
207. Id. 
208. Id. at 5. 
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events.209 In fact, a study conducted by the BPA shows that a 
higher TDG standard would reduce the need to curtail wind 
power “by between twenty-five and 100 megawatt months,” 
which is the equivalent of “six to seventeen percent less 
displacement of wind energy than under the lower TDG 
standard.”210 Conservation groups like Save Our Salmon and 
American Rivers recently petitioned Washington’s Department 
of Ecology and the State Legislature to increase the State’s 
maximum TDG standard to equal Oregon’s, which would allow 
the BPA to spill additional water and limit its curtailment 
practices.211 Increased spillage has even garnered the support 
of Judge Redden, an Oregon Federal District Court Judge 
overseeing the Columbia River BiOp process, who has ordered 
the BPA several times to spill excess water over its dams, even 
at the expense of hitting maximum TDG levels, in order to 
comply with the BPA’s obligations under the Endangered 
Species Act.212 
However, the BPA opposed these groups’ efforts, even 
though Oregon’s higher standard represents best available 
science and would allow the BPA to curtail less wind power.213 
Supporting the effort to increase Washington’s TDG standard 
is a cost-effective and efficient way to reduce the BPA’s 
reliance on curtailment policies admonished by FERC while 
still fulfilling its environmental obligation to protect 
endangered fish. In the future, the BPA should collaborate 
with these conservation groups’ lobbying efforts to change 
Washington’s maximum allowable TDG level to at least equal 
Oregon’s. 
209. Id. 
 210. BONNEVILLE POWER ADMIN., BPA AND FISH PASSAGE CENTER STUDY EFFECTS 
OF CHANGING TOTAL DISSOLVED GAS STANDARDS 2 (Apr. 2011). 
 211. Salmon Protest, supra note 41, at 5. 
 212. See, e.g., Nat’l Wildlife Fed’n, et. al. v. Nat’l Marine Fisheries Serv., et. al., No. 
CV 01-640-RE, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 29509, (D. Or. Dec. 29, 2005); Nat’l Wildlife 
Fed’n, et. al., v. Nat’l Marine Fisheries Serv., et. al., No. CV 01-640-RE, 2007 U.S. 
Dist. LEXIS 38010, (D. Or. May 23, 2007); Nat’l Wildlife Fed’n, et. al., v. Nat’l Marine 
Fisheries Serv., 839 F. Supp. 2d 1117 (D. Or. 2011). 
 213. Nat’l Wildlife Fed’n, et. al. v. Nat’l Marine Fisheries Serv., et. al., No. CV 01-
640-RE, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 29509, 4–5 (D. Or. Dec. 29, 2005). 
41
Pearsall: The Bonneville Power Administration's Energy Curtailment Problem:
Published by UW Law Digital Commons, 2013
120 WASHINGTON J. OF ENVIRONMENTAL LAW & POLICY [Vol. 3:1 
B. Upgrade and Expand the BPA’s Transmission System 
Capacity 
The Federal Columbia River Transmission System Act 
(FCRTS) requires the BPA to provide sufficient transmission 
capacity within its Balancing Authority Area.214 Specifically, 
the FCRTS requires the BPA to “operate and maintain the 
Federal transmission system within the Pacific Northwest 
and . . . construct improvements, betterments, and additions to 
and replacements of such system,” as are necessary to 
“integrate and transmit the electric power from existing or 
additional Federal or non-Federal generating units.”215 
Currently, the BPA’s transmission system cannot 
accommodate all of its own federally generated hydropower 
during high flow events, let alone accept current and future 
non-federal generated wind power, leading to the 
implementation of its curtailment policies.216 The failure to 
operate a transmission system with sufficient capacity to 
accept this power contradicts the BPA’s obligations under the 
FCRTS requiring it to “integrate and transmit” power from 
“existing or additional Federal or non-Federal generating 
units.”217 It also conflicts with statements made by the Obama 
Administration, which noted that the Department of Energy 
will require Power Marketing Administrations, like the BPA, 
to take steps to upgrade the transmission grid in order to 
better incorporate renewable energies such as wind power.218 
Nevertheless, the BPA continues to contract with wind 
power producers to accept additional capacity onto its already 
stressed system.219 By the end of 2013, the BPA expects to 
 214. See generally Federal Columbia River Transmission System Act of 1974, 16 
U.S.C. § 838b (2006). 
215. Id. § 838b, b(a) (emphasis added). 
216. See BPA’S NARRATIVE EXPLANATION, supra note 37, at 3–6. 
217. 16 U.S.C. § 838b(a) (2006). 
 218. See Salmon Protest, supra note 41, at 11; see also Letter from Steven Chu to 
Bonneville Power Administration (March 16, 2012), available at 
http://energy.gov/downloads/memorandum-secretary-chu-power-marketing-
adminstrations-role-march-16-2012. 
 219. See 2010 ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 19, at 14; see also BONNEVILLE POWER 
ADMIN., TRANSMISSION SERVICES, PLANNING & PROJECTS, WIND PROJECTS: CURRENT 
WIND PROJECTS, http://transmission.bpa.gov/PlanProj/Wind/ (page last modified Oct. 
26, 2012). 
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have 5000 megawatts220 of wind power connected to its 
transmission system, which will increase to over 7000 
megawatts by 2017.221 The BPA does not have the sufficient 
capacity on its transmission system to deliver this power 
reliably. The Administration should abide by the mandates set 
forth in the FCRTS to construct “improvements, betterments, 
and additions,” necessary to “integrate and transmit” the wind 
power it has already contracted to transmit in addition to the 
future wind power projects the BPA plans to integrate into its 
transmission system.222 
The BPA is beginning to invest in transmission system 
upgrades to expand capacity in order to support wind power 
integration through several recent projects: (1) two 500-kilovolt 
power lines that will offer 3000 megawatts of transmission 
service to wind power producers;223 (2) the new Central Ferry 
Substation located in Garfield County in southeast 
Washington, which connects Puget Sound Energy’s 343 
megawatt Lower Snake River Wind Project to the BPA’s 
transmission system;224 and (3) upgrades to high power 
transmission lines that run to California.225 Although an 
improvement, these projects provide nowhere near enough 
increased transmission capacity to accommodate existing and 
future wind power in Washington. The BPA must continue to 
invest heavily in upgrades to its transmission system. 
Although transmission system upgrades are expensive, the 
BPA does have outlets available to help defray transmission 
system upgrade costs, most notably the Northwest Power Act 
(NWPA). Section 7(g) of the NWPA allows the BPA to recover 
costs associated with its fish and wildlife protection obligations 
through adjustments to existing rates.226 In addition, the BPA 
 220. Press Release, supra note 203, at 1. 
 221. BONNEVILLE POWER ADMIN., Forecast of Renewable Projects Connected to BPA 
Grid based on Existing Queue and Recent Trends, BPA.GOV 
http://transmission.bpa.gov/PlanProj/Wind/documents/Renewable_Forecast_Graph_20
17.pdf (Oct. 1, 2012).
222. 16 U.S.C. §§ 838b, b(a), 838d. 
 223. Press Release, supra note 203, at 2. 
224. Id. 
225. See Sickinger, supra note 51, at 4. 
226. See generally Pacific Northwest Electric Power Planning and Conservation Act 
§ 7(g), 16 U.S.C. § 839e, (1994). See also Wind Protest, supra note 119, at 17–18.
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is entitled to a credit against its obligation to repay the 
Federal Government for expenditures made protecting fish and 
wildlife,227 countering the Administration’s argument 
defending its need to implement curtailment programs like the 
Redispatch Policy and Oversupply Protocol P. Rather than 
continue curtailment, the FCRTS and NWPA provide the BPA 
with valid options it can pursue to meet its fish and wildlife 
protection obligations, fulfill its duty to provide sufficient 
transmission capacity for federal and non-federal power 
sources, and comply with FERC’s order demanding the BPA 
provide fair, comparable, and non-preferential access to its 
transmission system. 
C. Implement a Fair Compensation Mechanism for Ongoing 
Curtailment Practices 
Curtailing wind power will always be controversial and will 
continue to attract the ire of the renewable energy industry.228 
However, the BPA could quell opposition to ongoing or future 
curtailment policies by wholly compensating renewable energy 
generators for their displaced power. For instance, Oversupply 
Protocol P, without its accompanying fifty-fifty Cost Allocation, 
provides relatively fair compensation for wind power 
producers’ lost production during curtailment. By paying these 
generators for the actual amount of RECs and PTCs lost, a 
majority of revenue is recouped. In addition, the BPA should 
reimburse all wind power producers for penalty costs incurred 
for failing to deliver power during curtailment. Moreover, the 
BPA must compensate facilities for any physical or operational 
losses caused by a forced shut down. Finally, and most 
importantly, the BPA should not implement a cost-sharing 
mechanism that equally allocates curtailment costs between 
the BPA and those entities whose energy it forcibly displaces. 
Instead, the BPA must allocate costs based on a true cost-
causation basis and pay generators for the amount of power 
that would have been placed on the transmission system, but 
227. Id. 
 228. See, e.g., Wind Protest, supra note 119; Complaint, supra note 7; Comments of 
Northwest & Intermountain Power Producers Ass’n and Electric Power Supply Ass’n 
in Support of Complaint, Iberdrola Renewables, Inc. v. Bonneville Power Admin., No. 
EL11-44-000 (Fed. Energy Regulatory Comm’n, July 19, 2011). 
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for curtailment. Conversely, the BPA could simply incur the 
costs for its curtailment policy and aggressively seek to recoup 
these expenses under section 7(g) of the NWPA. 
Oversupply Protocol P is a discriminatory curtailment policy 
that fails to address the major concern articulated in FERC’s 
order—that the BPA discriminates against non-federal power 
producers by giving federal hydropower preferential 
treatment.229 Oversupply Protocol P, which continues to curtail 
non-federal wind power, merely perpetuates the BPA’s 
previous Redispatch Policy that was explicitly invalidated by 
FERC.230 The BPA’s continued reliance on discriminatory 
actions directed at non-federal wind power producers is 
especially troublesome considering that alternative actions 
exist that would negate the need to curtail wind power. To 
comply with FERC’s order, the BPA must stop curtailing non-
federal wind power and implement alternative programs to 
deal with its problem of excess hydropower generation during 
high water flow events. 
229. See Order Granting Petition, supra note 11, ¶ 78. 
230. Id. 
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